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(iii) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
Is a retailer of allegedly defective goods entitled to b^ indemnified for its attorney's 
fees from a co-defendant manufacturer where the purported indemnitee's attorney's 
fees were expended to defend itself and not the manufacturer, where the retailer has 
paid nothing to the plaintiff and where the goods in question were never shown to be 
defective? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties to this appeal are co-defendants in a products liability action brought 
by the purchasers of a single-engine aircraft manufactured by respondent The Cessna 
Aircraft Company (CESSNA), and sold to plaintiffs by appellant Trans-West Aircraft 
Sales, Inc. (TRANS-WEST). TRANS-WEST cross-claimed against CESSNA for contribution. 
Prior to trial, the principal action was settled and plaintiffs gave a complete release. 
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court rendered summary judgment 
in favor of CESSNA and TRANS-WEST appealed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Before setting forth the facts which CESSNA believes support the judgment of 
the trial court, CESSNA feels constrained to point out that a party cannot cite references 
to its own pleadings or the testimony of its own witnesses as support for the proposition 
that a certain fact is uncontroverted. TRANS-WESTTs statement of facts is repleat with 
such citations. 
This action began as a products liability suit by the plaintiff-purchasers of a small 
aircraft against CESSNA, the manufacturer; Cessna Finance Corporation, the lienholder; 
Teledyne Industries, Inc., the engine manufacturer; AAR Northwest, Inc. (AAR), a regional 
distributor of CESSNA; and TRANS-WEST, the retail seller of the aircraft. Plaintiffs' 
-1-
claims were settled against all defendants under a usual release stipulating that such 
settlement constituted no admission of liability on the part of the settling defendants. 
TRANS-WEST made no contribution to the settlement and now seeks to recover its costs 
and attorney's fees from CESSNA. 
On April 18, 1979, TRANS-WEST sold the subject aircraft to plaintiffs. (R.4). 
TRANS-WEST purchased the aircraft from defendant AAR, its regional distributor, (Id.). 
In addition to providing plaintiffs with CESSNA sales literature, TRANS-WEST made 
oral representations regarding the economics of owning the subject aircraft and how 
fast the aircraft would depreciate, which representations were not contained in the 
CESSNA sales literature. (Grant Depo. at 86-7, attached to appellant's brief as pp. 45-47). 
Plaintiff Grant testified that the economics of owning it was one of the factors which 
motivated the purchase of the aircraft. (Id.) 
On January 29, 1982, plaintiffs purported to revoke their acceptance of the aircraft 
and tendered it to Cessna Finance Company through whom they had purchased it. (R.10). 
On June 10, 1982, plaintiffs commenced the instant action for damages against all defen-
dants. (R.2-16). 
Plaintiffs' complaint alleged deceit (R.5-10), negligent misrepresentation (R.ll), 
breach of express and implied warranty (R.ll-12), and negligence (R.13) against all defen-
dants, including TRANS-WEST, both as an agent of CESSNA and specifically on TRANS-
WEST's own behalf. (R.4, If 18). In April, 1983, TRANS-WEST cross-claimed against all 
its co-defendants, including AAR, the distributor from which it had purchased the airplane, 
seeking indemnity for the amount of any judgment plaintiffs recovered against TRANS-
WEST, plus interest, costs and attorney's fees. (R.1205-1209). 
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In February, 1985, a compromise settlement was reached between plaintiffs and 
all defendants, including TRANS-WEST. (R.1246-49). TRANS-WEST paid nothing to plain-
tiffs in settlement of the principal action. (R.1257). An order dismissing the entire action, 
except for TRANS-WESTTs cross-claims for indemnity, was entered by the district court. 
(R.1251-1252). It is admitted that there is no written or oral agreement by which CESSNA 
was obligated to accept TRANS-WESTTs alleged tender of defense (R.1386), and TRANS-
WESTTs cross-claim is predicated solely upon the doctrine of implied indemnity. 
On January 6, 1986, the district court denied TRANS-WESTTs motion for summary 
judgment and granted CESSNAS parallel motion, dismissing TRANS-WESTTs cross-claim 
for indemnity. (R.1401-03). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Since TRANS-WEST was defending itself against allegations of its own inten-
tional torts, breach of warranty and other wrongful conduct, its costs and attorneys 
fees were not expended for CESSNAS benefit, and TRANS-WEST is not entitled to indem-
nification from CESSNA. 
2. Since there was no showing of TRANS-WESTrs or CESSNAS liability before 
the principal action was settled, TRANS-WEST is not entitled to indemnification. 
POINT I. 
TRANS-WEST CANNOT RECOVER COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S 
FEES EXPENDED IN ITS OWN DEFENSE OF PLAINTIFFS1 
CLAIMS. 
In Utah, the rule is long-established that attorney's fees are not "damages" and 
that they will be awarded only when provided for by contract or statute. Devore v. 
Bostrum, 632 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1981). TRANS-WEST urges this Court to adopt an excep-
tion to this general rule, which is that an indemnitee may recover from his indemnitor 
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not only the amount the plaintiff recovered against the indemnitee, but also the indem-
nitee's costs and attorney's fees. 
The specific question of whether a retailer of goods may recover its attorney's 
fees from the manufacturer under an implied indemnity theory is one of first impression 
in Utah. Among other jurisdictions, there is a split of authority. TRANS-WEST relies 
on the decisions of a minority of jurisdictions which allow the retail seller to recover 
his attorney's fees from the manufacturer where the retailer has not changed or modified 
the goods prior to selling them to the plaintiff. However, the majority and better-reasoned 
rule is that where the retailer defends allegations directed at him and not the manufac-
turer, he cannot recover his attorney's fees. 
A. Where A Retailer Defends Against Allegations Made Against It, The Manufacturer 
Has No Duty To Indemnify The Retailer For Its Costs And Attorney's Fees. 
The most oft-cited majority rule case is Davis v. Air Tech Industries, Inc., 582 
P.2d 1010 (Cal. 1978). There, the California Supreme Court considered indemnity claims 
by a seller against a manufacturer, where both were co-defendants in a products liability 
case. At trial, both the manufacturer and the seller were found liable to the injured 
plaintiff. The trial court awarded the seller indemnification for all the damages it was 
obliged to pay the plaintiff and for the seller's attorney's fees in defending the action. 
The manufacturer, noting the general rule in California (as in Utah) that attorney's fees 
will be awarded only where a statute or an agreement so provides, appealed the award 
of attorney's fees. The California Supreme Court, Chief Justice Bird writing for the 
Court, reversed, stating: 
Davis urges this court to adopt a broad new exception autho-
rizing attorney's fees for defendants who prevail on claims 
for implied indemnity. 
-4-
Even if this court were to carve out such an exception 
for indemnified tort defendants, a review of the purpose 
behind this exception reveals that it would not apply in cases 
where the indemnitee incurred attorney's fees solely in defense 
of his own alleged wrongdoing. 
* * * 
The better reasoned, modern decisions . . . have refused to 
compel manufacturers to pay attorney's fees to indemnify 
its suppliers and distributors who have defended against allega-
tions that they were independently liable for negligence or 
breach of warranty, [citations omitted] To shift attorney's 
fees in such cases would be inconsistent with the general 
rule that tort defendants, even if vindicated, must pay for 
their own defense, [citation omitted]. 
Id. at 1012-13. See also, Harbor City Discount Auto Center, Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co., 157 Cal.Rptr. 438 (1979). 
The relative merits of CESSNA and TRANS-WEST's respective positions were 
recently discussed in detail by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
construing Idaho law. As in Utah, the Idaho courts have not spoken directly to this issue. 
In Weston v. Globe Slicing Machine Co., 621 F.2d 344 (9th Cir. 1980), the plaintiff filed 
a lawsuit against the manufacturer, the distributor and the retailer of a meat chopping 
machine which injured him, alleging theories of strict liability, negligence and breach 
of warranty. 
Subsequently, and exactly as TRANS-WEST did here, the retail seller filed a cross-
claim against the manufacturer for indemnification for fees and costs incurred in its 
defense against plaintiff's complaint. The retailer contended that it sold the meat chopping 
machine to plaintiff without any change in its condition and that any defect in the machine 
which might have caused plaintiff injury was therefore the manufacturer's responsibility. 
The jury found for plaintiff against the manufacturer, but found in favor of the retailer. 
However, the trial court dismissed the cross-claim with prejudice and the retailer appealed, 
contending its entitlement to recover the attorney's fees expended in its own, successful, 
defense. 
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed and expressly rejected the minority rule cases relied 
upon by the retailer: Pender v. Skillcraft Industries, Inc., 358 So.2d 45 (Fla. App. 1978), 
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Crosetti Bros., Inc., 475 P.2d 69 (Ore. 1970), and Addy 
v. Bolton, 183 S.E.2d 708 (S.C. 1971). Interestingly, these are the same cases upon which 
TRANS-WEST relies. The Court noted: 
Although we have distinguished the facts in the Pender 
case from those in our case, in any event, we respectfully 
decline to follow the decision in that case, and, instead approve 
the reasoning in the opinions of the California and North 
Dakota courts in Davis and Conrad as expressing sounder 
and more logical principles and results in cases involving 
facts and issues much like those in the case before us. 
We hold that Moore cannot recover indemnification for 
its attorney fees and costs from Globe since MooreTs defense 
expenses were incurred for Moorefs benefit in defending itself 
against allegations of its own wrong-doing. This is especially 
true in view of the Idaho general rule that a party must pay 
its own attorney fees in the absence of a statute or a contract 
providing otherwise, [citation omitted]. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court denying 
Moore indemnification for attorney fees and costs from Globe 
and dismissing MooreTs cross-claim against Globe with prejudice 
is affirmed. 
621 F.2d at 349-50. TRANS-WEST admits at page 2 of appellant's brief that the attorney's 
fees for which it seeks indemnification were incurred by TRANS-WEST ". . . in defending 
itself in the product liability action brought by the plaintiffs . . ." Thus, under the rule 
in Weston, even if CESSNA had been found liable to plaintiffs, TRANS-WEST, in defending 
against allegations of its own wrongdoing, would have no recourse against CESSNA for 
costs and attorneys fees. 
TRANS-WEST asserts that it made no express warranties other than those contained 
in CESSNA sales literature. Although this assertion is disputed by the testimony of plain-
tiff Grant, even if it were true it ignores the implied warranties arising by operation 
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of law. TRANS-WEST sold the airplane to plaintiffs, and therefore under Section 2-314 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, Utah Code Ann. Section 78A-2-314 (1965), impliedly 
warranted to plaintiffs that the goods were merchantable. Further, plaintiffs alleged 
that TRANS-WEST breached the implied warranty of "fitness for particular purposes." 
(R.12, 1f 1f 50 & 51). Only TRANS-WEST knew of the specific purpose for which plaintiffs 
desired to purchase and use this aircraft. Plaintiffs sued TRANS-WEST specifically on 
these warranties. Paragraph 18 of plaintiffs1 complaint state^: 
TRANS WEST, on its own behalf and as an agent of CESSNA 
. . . did advertise, describe and represent the'subject aircraft 
(Emphasis supplied). 
In addition to the implied warranties, plaintiffs al$o sued TRANS-WEST on the 
express warranties and representations that TRANS-WE$T alone made to plaintiffs. 
Contrary to TRANS-WESTTs representations to the Court, plaintiff Brooke Grant testified 
that a representative of TRANS-WEST made representations regarding the economics 
of owning the subject aircraft which were not included pn CESSNATs sales literature, 
i 
and that he relied on them. (Grant Depo. at 86-7, attached to appellants brief as pp. 
45-46). Plaintiff Grant further testified that the economics of owning the aircraft was 
one of the factors that motivated the purchase. (Grant Depb. at 20, attached as Appendix 
A). 
That TRANS-WEST was defending its own interests rather than CESSNAS is further 
demonstrated by reference to the first count of plaintiffs^ complaint, labelled "Deceit." 
The count, pleading the intentional tort of fraud, is directed against all defendants, in-
cluding TRANS-WEST. (R.5). Further, the prayer of the complaint seeks punitive damages 
-7-
from defendants, again including TRANS-WEST (R.16). These allegations of intentionally 
tortious conduct relate as much to TRANS-WEST as they do CESSNA or any of the other 
defendants. 
In addition, the principal remedy of recision sought by the plaintiffs was applicable 
only as against TRANS-WEST, plaintiffs' immediate seller. Prior to filing its action, 
plaintiffs tendered the airplane to defendant Cessna Finance Company, the secured cred-
itor through whom plaintiffs had financed the purchase. Plaintiffs' complaint seeks recis-
sion of the sale and specifically alleges that plaintiffs, by tendering the aircraft to the 
secured lender, have revoked their acceptance by purchase under Utah Code Ann. Section 
70A-2-608. There is no evidence that TRANS-WEST was acting as an agent of CESSNA 
when it sold the aircraft it had purchased from AAR to the plaintiffs, and the law is 
clear that a buyer of goods may revoke his acceptance or "rescind" only as to his immediate 
seller, and not as to the manufacturer (CESSNA) or intermediate supplier (AAR) of the 
goods. See, Clark v. Ford Motor Co., 612 P.2d 316, 318-19 (Ore. App. 1980); Reece v. Yeager 
Ford Sales, Inc., 184 S.E.2d 727, 10 U.C.C.R.S. 82 (W.Va. 1971). 
Also, contrary to the allegations of implied contract contained in Point Three 
of Appellant's Brief, there was no contact between TRANS-WEST and CESSNA regarding 
TRANS-WEST's purchase of the aircraft. All of TRANS-WEST's contacts regarding its 
purchase of the aircraft were directly with the defendant AAR (Appellant's Brief, p. 
7, para. 17). 
B. The Court Must Look To The Allegations Of The Complaint In Determining Whether 
TRANS-WEST Was Defending Itself Or CESSNA. 
On page 27 of appellant's brief, TRANS-WEST quotes the case of Herman v. General 
Irrigation Co., 247 N.W.2d 472 (N.D. 1976) for the proposition that it is entitled to indem-
nification for its attorney's fees. However, as pointed out by the North Dakota Supreme 
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Court in its subsequent decision in Conrad v. Suhr, 274 N.lfV.2d 572 (N.D. 1979), Herman 
did not address the question of attorney's fees as part 0f any indemnity award to a 
retailer-indemnitee. In Conrad, the Court adopted the majority rule on first impression 
and held that a dealer in farm equipment could not recover his costs and attorney's fees 
from the equipment's manufacturer, even though the retailer was exonerated at trial 
and the manufacturer was found liable to the plaintiff, the Court, relying on Farr v. 
Armstrong Rubber Co., infra, and Davis v. Air Tech Industries, Inc., supra, noted that 
the retailer had defended on allegations of his own negligence, breach of implied warranty 
and strict liability and, therefore, he could not recover attorney's fees not expended 
for the manufacturer's benefit. 
In deciding the question of whether a retailer claiming indemnity for his attorney's 
fees was defending against allegations of his own wrongful conduct (and thus would not 
be entitled to attorney's fees as a part of his indemnification), the Court in Conrad ruled 
that the pleadings and the allegations made by plaintiff shoul<3 be determinative. 
. . . [W]e express the view that the pleadings are an integral 
part of litigation and that in determining whether or not 
a party may be indemnified for his attorneys! fees and costs, 
the court may examine the pleadings to determine whether 
or not the party seeking indemnification from another was 
exclusively or partially defending itself against allegations 
of his own negligence, his own warranty, or of strict liability. 
Ld. at 578. The rule of the North Dakota Supreme Court in [Conrad was expressly adopted 
by the Court in Weston v. Globe Slicing Machine Co., 621 F^2d 344 (9th Cir. 1980) in con-
struing Idaho law. See p.p. 7-8, supra. 
Here, as the pleadings attest on their face, plaintiffs $ued TRANS-WEST not simply 
as an agent of CESSNA but in its own right, and for fraud, Negligence and breach of war-
ranties and representations for which TRANS-WEST was Responsible, and for a remedy 
(recision) which could be applicable only against its direct seller, TRANS-WEST. 
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C. The Question Of Whether TRANS-WEST Changed Or Inspected The Aircraft Before 
Sale To Plaintiffs Is Irrelevant To Whether TRANS-WEST Was Defending Allegations 
Made Against It. 
TRANS-WEST asserts that it was a "mere conduit" for the goods in question and 
that since it simply passed the goods along to plaintiffs without changing them, that 
it should be indemnified by the manufacturer. The majority of courts considering this 
argument have rejected it. For example, in Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 179 N.W.2d 
64 (Minn. 1970), the plaintiff was injured when his camper truck veered off the highway 
following a blow-out of one of its rear tires. Plaintiff sued both the manufacturer and 
the retailer of the allegedly defective tire, under theories of strict product liability and 
breach of implied warranties. The plaintiff prevailed against both defendants at trial. 
The trial court granted indemnity in favor of the retail seller against the manufacturer 
for the amount of the judgment, but denied the retailer's claim for attorneys' fees. 
In Farr, as here, the retailer argued that it was completely passive and had made 
no additional warranties of its own, save what were supplied by the tire's manufacturer. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged that the retailer had made no warranty 
of its own except for the implied warranty of merchantability and had not, in any event, 
perpetrated any active wrong on the plaintiff. 
. . . [A]s was correctly pointed out in the trial court's memo-
randum, Olson's liability stems solely from its passive role 
as the retailer of a defective product furnished to it by the 
manufacturer, and it therefore is entitled to indemnity. 
W!. at 72. 
Nonetheless, the Court sustained the trial court's refusal to award attorneys' fees 
noting that the retailer had been sued by plaintiff in its own right. 
In cases where a party seeking indemnity has been required 
to defend claims arising out of another's wrongful conduct 
and also to defend accusations which encompasses [sic] separate 
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wrongful acts, the court may properly disallow attorney's 
fees in indemnity actions. Since Olson was required to defend 
against the breach of warranty claims, it wa$ in the position 
of defending its own wrongful conduct and therefore reasonable 
attorneys' fees must be denied. (Emphasis supplied). 
Id. at 72-3. Thus, even though the retailer was defending himself only on the allegation 
of breaching the implied warranty of merchantability, his | entitlement to indemnity did 
not include attorneys' fees, for precisely that reason. See ^lso, Sorenson v. Safety Flate, 
Inc., 235 N.W.2d 848, 852 (Minn. 1975); Shaffer v. Honeyw|ell, Inc., 249 N.W.2d 251, 260 
(S.D. 1976). 
Likewise, in Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2|d 143, 156-57 (Mo. 1967), the 
court ruled that where the retail seller was defending itself against plaintiff's allegations 
of the retailer's own negligence, the retailer was not entitled to a judgment against the 
manufacturer for his defense costs, even where retailer had obtained a directed verdict 
against plaintiff at trial. 
It is important to bear in mind that the issue in this dase is not whether the retailer 
of defective goods has a claim for indemnification against the manufacturer of those 
goods for damages resulting from such defects. The question here is simply whether 
a retailer can recover its costs and attorney's fees from a manufacturer where the retailer 
was defending against allegations made against it. This is a distinction which TRANS-
WEST fails to make when it states on pages 20-21 of appellant's brief that Champion 
Mobile Homes v. Rasmussen, 553 S.W.2d 237 (Tex.Civ. A|pp. 1977) is ". . . on all fours 
factually with the instant case . . . ." That statement is not Correct. 
Champion involved cross-claims for contribution and! indemnity between a retailer 
and a manufacturer of goods. However, unlike the case at bar, a jury trial determined 
that the goods in question were defective when they left the manufacturer's control 
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and both the retailer and the manufacturer were found to be liable to the plaintiff. This 
critical distinction aside, however, the holding in Champion is of no assistance to TRANS-
WEST, since although indemnity was granted, no attorney's fees or costs were awarded. 
TRANS-WEST also relies on the Florida District Court of Appeal's decision in 
the leading minority rule case, Pender v. Skillcraft Industries, Inc., 358 So.2d 45 (1978). 
That case, too, is distinguishable on its facts from the case at bar. There, the manu-
facturer was found at trial to be liable to the plaintiff, and the retailer-indemnitee was 
completely exonerated. Although the court permitted the indemnitee to recover his 
attorney's fees even though he paid no judgment, the Pender decision cautions against 
the broad-brush approach to indemnification urged by TRANS-WEST in this appeal: 
Our holding should not be construed to open a floodgate for 
cross-claims seeking indemnification when there is no connec-
tion between the cross-claimants and the party from whom 
indemnification is sought. 
Id. at 46. 
Here, although there is a dealer agreement between TRANS-WEST and CESSNA, 
TRANS-WEST did not acquire the plane from CESSNA, but purchased it from AAR. 
(R.1158). Since there is no privity between CESSNA and TRANS-WEST, TRANS-WEST 
would not be entitled to its attorney's fees from CESSNA, but rather would have to look 
to its seller, AAR. Although TRANS-WEST cross-claimed against AAR for indemnity, 
it elected not to pursue the matter against AAR. 
Further, in a decision of the Florida District Court of Appeals since Pender, it 
was held in Maple Chair Co. v. W. S. Babcock Corp., 385 So.2d 1036 (Fla. App. 1980) that 
the trial court's award of indemnity on the retailer's motion for summary judgment was 
improper since there had been no finding of any liability of the manufacturer to the plain-
tiff. In the instant case, CESSNA was never found liable to the plaintiffs, the action 
having been settled without any finding or admission of liability. 
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D. CESSNA Had No Obligation To Accept TRANS-WEST's "Tender." 
TRANS-WEST makes much ado about its "tender1' of the defense of plaintiffs1 
claims against TRANS-WEST at the inception of the litigation. CESSNA submits that 
the issue of the propriety of TRANS-WESTTs "tender" is immaterial since, even if a proper 
tender was made, CESSNA had no duty to defend TRANS-WEST given the substance 
of plaintiffs' allegations. 
The record reflects that upon receiving the summons and complaint, TRANS-WEST'S 
manager telephoned the AAR zone manager and informed him of the suit, and demanded 
that CESSNA accept the defense of TRANS-WEST. (Battachio Depo. at 13, R.1417 jet 
seq.) Unsurprisingly, since he was unaware of any of the allegations of the complaint, 
TRANS-WEST's demand was refused. (Id. at 14, 20, R.1417 et se£.) Nothing in the record 
indicates that TRANS-WEST's "tender" was ever reiterated or even put in writing. 
As has been demonstrated at length above, the complaint alleges fraud, breach 
of express and implied warranties and negligence on the part of TRANS-WEST, not only 
as an agent of CESSNA, but in its own right. It prays for a revocation of its acceptance 
of the aircraft from TRANS-WEST and asks for punitive damages against all defendants, 
including TRANS-WEST. 
The very purpose behind the doctrine of indemnity is 
. . . to authorize the reimbursement of the defense costs 
of a party held constructively liable "because of the actual 
default of another for whose benefit the defense [was] really 
conducted . . ." 
Davis v. Air Technical Industries, Inc., supra, at 1012 (Emphasis in original) quoting C. 
& Q. C. Co. v. County Comm'rs., 57 Md. 201, 226 (1881). It is apparent that TRANS-WEST 
was "tendering" the defense of causes of action alleged against itself. Under such circum-
stances, the majority of jurisdictions considering the matter have concluded that any 
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award of indemnity does not include the costs of defense. TRANS-WEST had many months 
before the case was sett led in which it could have a t tempted to eliminate plaintiffsT 
allegations against it which it now so vociferously denies, but TRANS-WEST did nothing. 
If, as TRANS-WEST claims, this was CESSNAS fight alone, why were such allegedly 
spurious claims not eliminated by pretrial procedures and the case then tendered to 
CESSNA? There was never a proper tender because the claims being made individually 
against TRANS-WEST were never eliminated and any vicarious claims made "tenderable." 
POINT II. 
A RETAILER CANNOT CLAIM INDEMNITY WHERE NEITHER 
THE MANUFACTURER NOR THE RETAILER HAVE BEEN 
FOUND LIABLE AND THERE HAS BEEN NO FINDING THAT 
THE PRODUCT WAS DEFECTIVE. 
Finally, even applying the minority rule advanced by TRANS-WEST, it has not 
shown a substantive enti t lement to indemnification from CESSNA. A retai ler such as 
TRANS-WEST has the burden of proof to show it is entitled to indemnification. As the 
Idaho Supreme Court held in Williams v. Johnston, 442 P.2d 178, 184 (Idaho 1968), 
It is the conclusion of the court that unless liability of the 
claimed indemnitee [retail seller] to the third party [injured 
plaintiff] is established, the right to indemnification does 
not arise. 
Here, nothing in the proceedings before the district court demonstrated that CESSNA 
was liable to plaintiffs or that the subject aircraft was defective, nor that any defect 
resulted in injury to plaintiffs. The admitted language of the set t lement release signed 
by plaintiffs specifically s ta tes : 
IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that this 
set t lement is a compromise of a contingent and unliquidated 
claim and that payment hereunder is not to be construed 
as an admission of liability on the part of those released, 
by whom liability is expressly denied. 
(R.1386). 
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Even under the authorities accepting the minority view advanced by TRANS-WEST, 
a retailer must still show that the manufacturer supplied a defective product which caused 
injury to the plaintiff, before the issue of the retailer's ri^ht to indemnification can be 
addressed. In D.G. Shelter Products Co. v. Moduline Industries, Inc., 684 P.2d 839 (Alaska 
1984), the purchaser of a new mobile home sued the manufacturer, MODULINE, and the 
retail seller, Pioneer Brokerage and Sales (PIONEER) for physical injuries allegedly caused 
by formaldehyde fumes emanating from the mobile home. Shortly before trial, MODULINE 
filed a third-party action against SHELTER and other component suppliers. The trial 
court severed the third-party action for trial. 
After a jury trial, judgment was rendered in favor of MODULINE and PIONEER. 
The judgment was appealed and the case remanded for retHal. Before the second trial, 
PIONEER, MODULINE, SHELTER and the other third-party defendants jointly settled 
the owner's claim. After the settlement, MODULINE sought an award of attorneys fees 
from SHELTER on the theory of common law indemnity and breach of warranty. The 
trial court granted summary judgment and awarded attorneys fees to MODULINE. 
On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the aw^rd of attorney's fees holding: 
We hold that summary judgment was improper. The settle-
ment agreement between Moduline and Shelter did not have 
the effect the trial court thought it did. Shelter did not admit 
to having produced a defective product. It Explicitly stated 
that the settlement agreement: 
is in no way to be construed as a judicial admission 
of defect or as an opinion that it would have been 
possible for William and Arline Heritage to establish 
the existence of the defect if there had been a full 
and complete trial on the merits . . . . 
Whether Shelter supplied a defective product must be resolved 
before liability for attorneys fees can be determined. 
Id. at 541. 
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In the instant case, the principal action was settled before trial and neither 
TRANS-WEST nor CESSNA were found liable to plaintiffs, nor was the subject aircraft 
ever found to be defective. TRANS-WEST has cited no case where indemnity of attorneys 
fees was awarded in circumstances where the retailer was never found liable to the plain-
tiff and no determination was ever made that the goods were defective or non-conforming. 
TRANS-WEST misconstrues the pleading rules and the two cases it cites in Point 
Six of its brief. They merely hold that indemnity claims may be filed in the principal 
action so that all claims may be decided in one action. They do not suggest that the 
indemnitee need not prove the liability of the indemnitor at some point in the litigation 
in order to hold the indemnitor liable. Since TRANS-WEST had the burden of proving 
such a defect by a preponderance of evidence and failed to do so, the trial court properly 
entered judgment in favor of CESSNA. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING CESSNAS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
TRANS-WEST asserts in Point Nine of its brief that the trial court erred in "not 
allowing" a trial on the issue of whether the aircraft in question was defective. This 
is indeed an interesting argument considering the fact that TRANS-WEST, as well as 
CESSNA, made a motion for summary judgment, thereby representing to the trial court 
that it had placed in evidence all the facts which it wanted the court to consider in ruling 
upon its claim. The court below did not refuse to allow a trial as TRANS-WEST contends, 
but simply granted one partyTs motion for summary judgment on cross-motions of both 
parties, which asserted that no material issues remained in controversy and that each 
was willing to have its case determined on the record then existing as a matter of law. 
TRANS-WEST now takes the position of demanding a trial on the question of 
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whether the aircraft was defective. Putting aside the point that under the majority 
rule such an inquiry would be irrelevant since TRANS-WEST was defending only itself 
in the action, TRANS-WEST is not now entitled to a trial on the issue since it not only 
failed to request it in the court below, but affirmatively asserted that such a trial was 
unnecessary due to the absence of any material questions of fact necessary to decide 
the issues raised by its motion for summary judgment. It is fundamental that a party 
may not claim as error a position raised for the first time on appeal. See Utah County 
v. Brown, 672 P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 1983); Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development 
Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983). 
CONCLUSION 
The majority and better-reasoned cases throughout the nation "have refused to 
compel manufacturers to pay attorneys fees to indemnify suppliers and distributors who 
have defended against allegations that they were independently liable for negligence 
or breach of warranty." Davis v. Air Technical Industries, Inc., 582 P.2d 1010, 1012 (Cal. 
1978). Although the retailer may be indemnified for any judgment he must pay to the 
injured plaintiff, where he defends on his own behalf his right to indemnity does not include 
costs and attorneys fees, since these were not expended for the manufacturer's benefit. 
CESSNA submits that attorney's fees cannot be awarded since TRANS-WEST was 
clearly defending its own interests and not those of CESSNA. This is particularly true 
considering the long-established rule in Utah that except where provided for by statute 
or contract, a tort defendant must bear his own attorney's fees. To hold that TRANS-WEST 
may recover its attorney's fees under the circumstances of this case would be to cut 
a gaping hole into an otherwise seamless cloth. 
In addition, even if a rule awarding a retailer indemnification for his attorney's 
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fees were adopted, TRANS-WEST has shown no substantive entitlement to any such indem-
nification, since there has been no finding that the product was defective or that TRANS-
WEST or CESSNA was liable to the plaintiffs. No trial on these issues is required since 
TRANS-WEST made no request for trial to the district court, but rather, moved for sum-
mary judgment. In any event, the issue of whether the goods in question were defective 
or not is irrelevant, since TRANS-WESTTs attorney's fees were clearly incurred to defend 
against allegations directed towards it, including recision. 
CESSNA respectfully prays that the judgment of the trial court be affirmed and 
that it be awarded its costs on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of July, 1986. 
H. WAYNE WADSWORTH 
R. L. KNUTH 
of and for 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent The Cessna Aircraft 
Company. 
-18-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF 
OF RESPONDENT THE CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY was mailed, postage prepaid, 
to the following counsel of record this 2nd day of July, 1986: 
Paul N. Cotro-Manes, Esq. 
311 South State Street, Suite 280 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
Of Respondent's Counsel 
-19-
APPENDIX A 
Q When you say this P-210, you mean the subject plane we're 
all talking about? 
A Yes. It generally had — they were generally very heavy 
in avionics and that was necessary to obtain what Cessna was 
telling me that they could obtain, the efficiency, the 
effectiveness, to be as good as a twin would be. 
Q Can you think of any other features that you — that 
motivated your purchase? 
A Let me think for a minute. I think one critical one was 
the economics of operating the P-210, and it's what Cessna 
pushed was the fact that you could operate one and obtain the 
same results as with a twin at a lower cost. It was 
supposedly the lowest cost pressurized airplane, and the 
single engine, of course, burned half or less the fuel than a 
twin engine would, so the economics were a very major reason 
and as you know, by 1979, gas prices were starting to increase 
substantially. 
Q Have we exhausted those features that attracted you to 
the P-210? 
A No, there's some other ones. It was gorgeous looking, 
sexy, exciting and, you know, the ultimate. It was the 
neatest airplane to have come along. 
Q I wonder if you could tell me who financed the sale of 
the aircraft? 
A Cessna did. 
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